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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of the project is: 
 
- to assist the British countryside agencies to develop a new model 
for rural support measures to maximise the environmental benefits 
of agricultural policy reforms; 
 
- to identify the best means of promoting the ideas, with a view to 
influencing the debate over Agenda 2000 and longer term CAP 
reform and making links to wider rural policy. 
 
The starting point for the work is the agencies' response to the European 
Commission's Agenda 2000 draft Regulations (CEC, 1998).  That 
response, while welcoming certain progressive elements, expressed grave 
disquiet at "the continuing imbalance in the budget in favour of the 
market regimes" (para 11.1). 
 
The agencies thus are looking beyond Agenda 2000 to seek more 
fundamental reform towards “a more sustainable multi-functional model 
of rural policy” (para 4.1).  This is the focus of the second section of our 
report. 
 
Meanwhile, the agencies are seeking to build upon the progressive 
elements in Agenda 2000 and have proposed that "the UK must maximise 
new opportunities to adapt measures to a wider range of 'public good' 
objectives, including protection of the environment and enhancement of 
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the natural heritage”.  These issues are taken up in the third section of our 
report. 
 
The agencies also sought guidance on how to promote the ideas 
developed in the project, including how environmental objectives for 
CAP reform might be related to rural socio-economic objectives.  These 
issues are taken up in the fourth section of our report. 
 
The report thus has three main sections: 
 
- Section 2, entitled clarifying the principles, seeks to present a 
robust conceptualisation on which to base an alternative vision to 
guide CAP reform; 
 
- Section 3, entitled devising a strategy, seeks to clarify the choices 
and options currently (or soon likely to be) available in pursuing 
policy and institutional reform; 
 
- Section 4, entitled promoting  the ideas, suggests how to take 
forward the proposals for combining environmental and 
agricultural objectives and relating these to the implementation of 
wider rural policy. 
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2.  CLARIFYING THE PRINCIPLES 
 
In response to the Agenda 2000 draft Regulations, the agencies set out 
their own model for rural support measures in Europe.  To match 
society's needs and expectations from rural areas, rural support measures 
should include “a combination of regulations to prevent irreversible and 
damaging activities by land managers; and positive incentives to reward 
careful management of the rural environment, which cannot be secured 
by regulations alone, and which goes beyond what markets will pay” 
(para A1). 
 
The policy model proposed was envisaged as a 'pyramid' of measures 
fully decoupled from current production, comprising:  
 
- A regulatory baseline of minimum standards applicable to all 
agricultural land to ensure that key environmental resources across 
rural Europe were protected from irreversible and damaging 
activities by land managers. 
 
- A basic tier contract offered to every farm and forest land manager 
as an “environmental resource payment” for the maintenance of the 
basic fabric of the countryside. 
 
- Higher tier, more targeted measures available where resources 
were particularly needed either to achieve special management of 
areas of high environmental value, or to restore degraded rural 
areas, or to revitalise the rural economy. 
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A Pyramid of Decoupled Policy Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pyramid model has certain obvious shortcomings: 
 
- it is static and cannot show changing priorities; 
- the social aspect of rural development policy is under emphasised; 
- it incorporates a restricted view of the choice of environmental 
measures; 
- its vertical axis confuses environmental value and management 
requirements. 
 
In rethinking the pyramid it is important to be clear about what it is 
seeking to achieve.  The key objectives appear to be: 
 
Environmental 
management 
requirements 
Baseline of minimum standards for all rural land 
     Environmental resource payments 
  Targeted measures 
 Special 
   sites          
0%    Area of Land                100% 
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- a spatially inclusive approach that recognises a basic and varied 
environmental interest across the whole countryside, with 
concentrations of higher conservation value set within; 
- an integrated approach to policy development that seeks to reduce 
the contradictions, and to increase the synergy, between 
agricultural and environmental policy; 
- a strategic approach to environmental management and protection 
that recognises that different objectives require a range of measures 
and instruments. 
 
A first step therefore is to clarify the thinking behind each of these 
objectives.  The three strands of analysis that need to be addressed are the 
following:- 
 
- the notion of the multifunctionality of agriculture and rural 
resources (subsection 2.1); 
- the critical linkages between agricultural and  environmental policy 
(subsection 2.2); 
- the differentiation between policy measures and instruments 
available to promote rural environmental management and 
protection (subsection 2.3). 
 
It is also important that an evolutionary approach is adopted to the reform 
process which sees each successive stage not as an end in itself but as a 
step towards an alternative model.  We return to this issue in section 4, 
where we also consider how to strengthen the linkages between 
agricultural and environmental policy and rural policy. 
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2.1  The Multifunctionality of Agriculture and Rural Resources 
 
Rural resources have a variety of functions which are used and valued by 
society in multiple ways.  Agriculture is the chief economic user of rural 
resources in situ.  The multifunctionality of agriculture has been defined 
as follows: 
 
“Beyond its primary function of supplying food and fibre, 
agricultural activity can also shape the landscape, provide 
natural resources and the preservation of bio-diversity, and 
contribute to the socio-economic viability of many rural 
areas”.  (OECD, 1998) 
 
Recognising the multifunctionality of agriculture is a step toward 
sustainable development.  Putting sustainable agriculture into practice 
implies a multidimensional approach which includes economic, 
ecological and socio-economic aspects. The Agricultural Advisory Group 
of the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has recommended 
that “the UK Government should develop the multifunctionality concept 
so that it supports a wider vision of the positive role of agriculture in the 
rural economy and the natural landscape” (MAFF, 1999, para. 6.6). 
 
The concept of multifunctionality is set to figure prominently in 
international trade talks on agriculture.  It is being promoted by European 
countries and some Asian ones (especially Japan) as a counter to free 
trade arguments and as a justification for continuing public support for 
agriculture.  Multifunctionality has thus acquired political currency and 
may well become a point of contention between European and Cairns 
Group negotiators.  A key point at issue will be the extent to which trade 
and production policy can be divorced from rural environmental and 
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socio-economic policy.  From the perspective of multifunctionality the 
argument would be that they should not, indeed cannot, be divorced. 
 
The multifunctionality of agriculture implies that in producing marketable 
products, it also generates wider, non-market effects and services some of 
which are regarded as beneficial and others as harmful.  The introduction 
of policies for these countryside goods (or bads) may tend either to 
reduce or increase agricultural output: it depends on the measure taken 
(whether using incentives or penalties) and on the technical relationship 
(whether substitutional or  complementary) with agricultural production.  
Rather than trade distorting, such policies should be seen as correcting the 
failure of the market to take due account of non-market effects, provided 
that their impacts on production are incidental to their purpose in 
improving environmental welfare.  
 
2.2  The Critical Linkages between Agricultural and Environmental 
Policy 
 
Two models of the relationship between non-market environmental 
effects and agricultural production have gained currency in policy circles:  
 
- the ‘impact’ model, where environmental impacts or negative 
externalities are directly associated with input use (e.g. more 
fertiliser use leading to more pollution, or headage payments 
stimulating overstocking). The model assumes an agriculture 
operating in opposition to the environment.  Therefore a reduction 
in the intensity of production will automatically lead to an 
 8 
improvement in environmental quality.  It follows that policies to 
improve the environment should restrict agricultural activity. 
 
- the ‘public goods’ model, where environmental attributes or 
positive externalities take the form of jointly produced public 
goods (e.g. the pastoral landscapes maintained by grazing systems, 
or the management of hedgerows that encourage wildlife).  The 
model is premised on agricultural systems or farming practices that 
have co-evolved with the environment, often over substantial 
periods of time, to the extent that there is a close interrelationship 
between the valued characteristics of the environment and certain 
features of the farming. The ‘public goods’ model therefore 
suggests a more complex and indeterminate relationship with 
production:  it assumes not only that different levels of intensity 
will lead to different mixes of environmental attributes;  but also 
that a cessation in certain practices will actually diminish 
environmental quality.  The implications are less clear cut, but 
often imply that policy should support agricultural systems, 
especially where the major environmental threat arises from a 
decline or abandonment in agricultural uses.  Environmental loss 
may not always follow from abandonment, however:  for example, 
on moorland or heathland the low intensity grazing role played by 
domestic animals may be replaced by that of wild animals such as 
deer or rabbits.   
 
While the ‘impact’ model tends to be used in assessments of more 
intensive production systems and such non-market effects as pollution 
and soil erosion, the ‘public goods’ model tends to focus on more 
extensive systems and on such non-market effects as landscape and 
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wildlife.  The two also point to different strategic responses: the ‘impact’ 
model emphasises a combination of market mechanisms (including price 
liberalisation) and environmental regulations to achieve an efficient yet 
sustainable agriculture; whereas the ‘public goods’ model emphasises a 
combination of market mechanisms and incentives to support 
conservation-oriented practices. 
 
The two, though, are not necessarily incompatible, but highlight different 
facets of the relationship between agriculture and the environment.  The 
‘impact’ model concentrates on resource use and its effects, whereas the 
‘public goods’ model concentrates on management practices and 
requirements.  In most contexts, indeed, there can be elements of both.   
For example, in intensive arable areas, the management of field 
boundaries is more appropriately considered from the perspective of the 
‘public goods’ model.  On the other hand, in extensive systems 
overgrazing of fragile environments exemplifies the ‘impact’ model. 
 
Finally, a change in the type of technology or agricultural system, 
perhaps induced by shifts in policy or prices, may entail a switch of 
model.   For example, overgrazing of moorland by sheep would accord 
with the ‘impact’ model:  a reduction in the level of bought-in feed might 
be assumed to lead to more extensive and less damaging grazing.  But if 
there were also a significant reduction in labour input, such farming 
systems could go over to ranching, with consequent environmental losses, 
and that would accord with the ‘public goods’ model.  The possibility of 
such system changes (rather than movements up or down a spectrum of 
intensity of inputs) ensures the bluntness of such macro interventions as 
price adjustments; and points to the need specifically to maintain desired 
farming systems or practices, to achieve environmental objectives. 
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2.3  The Differentiation between Policy Measures and Instruments 
for Rural Environmental Management and Protection 
 
Any policy field is pursued through a number of policy measures.  For 
example, landscape conservation is implemented through such measures 
as National Parks, hedgerow protection, ESAs, Tree Preservation Orders 
and land use planning.  Particular measures may serve a number of 
different policies.  ESAs are a case in point, being a measure that serves 
landscape, nature conservation, heritage and agricultural policies.  
Making such measures multipurpose may thus be an important way of 
seeking policy integration. 
 
Any particular policy measure can, in turn, draw on a number of different 
policy instruments.  ESAs, for example, use two instruments.  Firstly, 
through incentives linked to management agreements, they promote 
conservation-oriented agriculture.  Secondly, through project officers, 
they also provide information, advice and reinforcement for farmers on 
suitable land management practices.  These two instruments - incentives 
and persuasion - are common to many policy measures.  For example, 
SSSIs use them both, as well as the instruments of compulsion and 
public-interest ownership.   The combination of instruments under any 
particular policy measure gives officials a choice of courses of action. 
 
To develop a strategy for rural environmental management we need to 
establish a framework which systematically classifies the way different 
measures and instruments are deployed. 
 
The types of policy measures used for rural environmental management 
and protection can be classified according to whether they deal with 
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positive or negative externalities and how general or specific and intense 
these externalities are, as follows:  
       
Promoting   
positive 
• protected sites and features, e.g. National Parks,  
     SSSIs, Protected Hedgerows, etc. 
externalities • stewardship areas, e.g. ESAs, Tir Cymen,  
     Heritage Land, etc. 
 • general environmental standards, e.g. Codes  
     of Good Practice, Integrated Crop Management,  
     Quality Assurance Schemes, etc. 
  
Combating 
negative 
externalities 
• general environmental regulations, e.g. Water  
     Pollution Control, Land Use Planning, Pesticide  
     Use Regulation, etc. 
 • specific restrictions, e.g. Groundwater Protection,  
    Controls over Livestock Housing, etc. 
 
The range of instruments available can be classified according to the 
degree of public intervention in private production activities as follows: 
 
- persuasion (i.e. information, advice and reinforcement) e.g. 
conservation advisory services, pollution prevention information, 
conservation training, voluntary codes, LEAF demonstration farms, 
guidance on use of agrochemicals, etc. 
 
- market mechanisms (i.e. adjustments to prices and taxes, product 
regulation and marketing) e.g. cuts in output prices, conditions on 
subsidies, pesticide tax, organic standards, green labelling, etc
 Figure 1                                                   TYPES OF POLICY MEASURES                                                 RANGE OF INSTRUMENTS USED 
                                                                                    Persuasion     Market Incentives    Compulsion       Public-Interest 
                 Mechanisms                                                       Ownership
    
Promoting Biodiversity,                                     Protected sites  
Positive landscape,                                          and features 
Externalities conservation     
 of natural                                           e.g. National Parks; SSSIs;  
 resources                                                  Protected Hedgerows 
 
                                                      Stewardship areas  
                                      e.g. ESAs; Tir Cymen; Heritage Land 
                                                                                                             
                                                           Environmental standards (non compulsory) 
                                     e.g. Codes of Good Practice; Integrated Crop Management; 
                                                                          Quality Assurance Schemes       
                                         
                                                                General environmental regulations 
                                                              e.g. Water Pollution Control; Land Use Planning; 
                                                                                 Pesticide Use Regulation    
   
Combating Pollution,                                        Specific restrictions 
Negative loss of amenity 
Externalities degradation                                   e.g. Groundwater Protection;                                                                                            
 of natural resources                            Controls over Livestock  
                                  Housing                         
 
                                                     0                   Area of Land (not to scale)                100
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- incentives (i.e. payments or rebates for voluntary action that 
favours conservation) e.g. agri-environment payments, heritage tax 
allowances, compensatory management agreements, access 
payments, etc. 
 
- compulsion (i.e. legal prohibitions and obligations and regulation 
of land use and management) e.g. hedgerow regulations, 
conservation orders, development control, notification procedures, 
pollution regulations, etc. 
 
- public-interest ownership (i.e. the transfer of ownership of land to 
public bodies or public trusts) e.g. compulsory purchase orders, 
National Nature Reserves, ownership by national park authorities, 
the National Trust or wildlife trusts, etc. 
 
Figure 1 combines these two classifications to show the range of policy 
measures for rural environmental management and protection (the y-axis) 
and the instruments that each can typically draw upon (the x-axis).  The 
different patterns of intervention that the Figure presents reflect the style 
of policy from which they are derived.  Three traditions are converging 
here:   
 
- a rural conservation tradition combining land-use regulations, 
incentives and prohibitions;   
- an agricultural policy tradition of incentives and market 
mechanisms;  and 
- a pollution control tradition of preventative advice backed up by 
sanctions.   
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Inevitably, difficulties arise in reconciling these different approaches.  
Nevertheless some implicit principles can be discerned acting across the 
different layers:  
 
- that policy measures to deal with negative externalities usually 
have an element of compulsion;   
- that specific and intense positive externalities may also attract 
public protection;   
- that provision of positive externalities requires or deserves 
encouragement from incentives or market mechanisms;  and  
- that persuasion underpins all policies. 
 
The division between the layers is not a technical matter but is 
institutionally determined according to which instruments prevail - for 
example, the division between the environmental standards and the 
environmental regulation layers is determined by which standards are 
discretionary and which are compulsory.  The divisions are therefore not 
hard and fast, can change over time and are often a matter of dispute. 
 
In particular, there is a lack of consensus over what constitutes a positive 
externality meriting some reward or a negative externality meriting some 
penalty.  The problem is that different groups in society have different 
views upon appropriate baselines.  For example, a farmer draining a piece 
of what was wetland may consider the current situation to be a suitable 
reference point.  Consequently, if drainage were to stop and the field 
reverted to wetland, this would represent a positive effect and would 
merit some reward.  In contrast, an environmental group might regard the 
appropriate reference point to be the undrained wetland, and therefore the 
act of continuing drainage would be generating a negative externality 
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meriting some penalty.  An added complication is that the same farming 
practice may produce both positive and negative externalities (e.g. 
landscape maintenance and agricultural pollution).    
 
These conflicts and ambivalences can only be resolved by reference to 
higher objectives.  In the past, when the pursuit of increased agricultural 
productivity and self-sufficiency was the overriding goal, the norms were 
those given by considerations of production efficiency. The shift towards 
multifunctionality as the basis of policy establishes different norms to do 
with sustainable development or environmental management, as 
expressed, for example, in the UK Sustainable Development Strategy 
(UK Government, 1994a) or the Biodiversity Action Plan (UK 
Government, 1994b).  Part of the process of elaborating these new norms 
should be to formulate agreed baselines concerning the proper state of 
agricultural environments. 
 
That set of judgements has significant resource as well as institutional 
implications.  A key issue is whether farmers should be rewarded simply 
for observing minimum environmental standards or for achieving 
something better.  This is the distinction between a regulatory floor and 
‘so-called’ target levels, the setting of which is likewise a political rather 
than a technical judgement.  The layer labelled general environmental 
standards and its upper and lower boundaries are thus the subject of 
considerable contention and uncertainty.  Shifting the boundaries implies 
moving certain classes of problem from one policy tradition to another.  
While some environmental organisations press to have the regulatory 
floor raised, some farming groups seek to lower the requirements for 
entry into incentive schemes.  Thus this issue cannot be divorced from 
medium-term considerations of resource availability and trends in 
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regulatory policy and law (see subsection 3.3).  Similar issues arise in 
relation to the possibility of attaching qualifying conditions concerning 
standards of environmental management to commodity payments (what is 
termed cross-compliance) - with the debate again being about what, if 
anything, farmers should reasonably be expected to do over and above 
legal minimum requirements. 
 
An important corollary of the argument that the division between the 
layers is institutionally determined is that it will vary between 
institutional contexts.  For example, in different countries similar actions 
by farmers that may damage the environment are treated differently, 
reflecting divergent societal judgements regarding farmers’ 
environmental responsibilities (IEEP, 1991).  This renders problematic 
the search for common standards between countries, including across the 
European Union, unless this could be achieved through institutional 
convergence based on a consensus over agriculture’s wider functions and 
responsibilities.  The tendencies may be in the opposite direction, 
however, especially with the increasing emphasis on the regional and 
territorial distinctiveness of agriculture.  The devolution of legislative 
authority and resource allocation to Scotland and Wales, for example, 
opens up the prospect of a growing divergence in resource availability 
and trends in regulatory policy and law between the countries of the 
United Kingdom.  Already we can see this happening in separate rural 
policies for England, Scotland and Wales, in the different agri-
environment measures adopted and in divergent proposals for the reform 
of special area safeguards. 
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3.  DEVISING A STRATEGY 
 
In devising a strategy for integrating the environment into agriculture, a 
number of choices and options present themselves which we consider 
below under the headings:  progressing UK practice through Agenda 
2000 (subsection 3.1);  implementing agri-environmental policy 
(subsection 3.2);  and improving regulation (subsection 3.3). 
 
3.1  Progressing UK Practice through Agenda 2000 
 
Agenda 2000 is only a partial step forward, for two reasons.  First, in its 
reform of the CAP it only addresses part of the pyramid - essentially the 
environmental standards and stewardship layers.  Second, it is a rather 
limited reform, and is to be revisited in 2002.  It is important therefore to 
make the most of it, but to keep in mind the larger picture and to look to 
subsequent stages. 
 
The salient elements of the reform, from the point of view of the greening 
of the CAP, are (see Figure 2): 
 
- the additional direct resources available for environmental 
measures (through monies recouped from the imposition of 
modulation and cross-compliance conditions and through the 
‘greening’ of Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances – HLCAs); 
- other, indirect resources that could be inflected towards 
environmental ends (mainly through the national envelope and the 
instrument of cross-compliance); 
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Figure 2    The Changing Architecture of the CAP 
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- the institutional changes that could facilitate the integration of 
agricultural and environmental objectives. 
 
The first two subsections below examine the direct and indirect resources.  
Then the scope is considered for achieving an integrated system of 
supports specifically focussed on environmental and social objectives for 
Less Favoured Areas.  For agriculture elsewhere, much greater emphasis 
will need to be given to promoting environmental standards through a 
variety of mechanisms.   Finally, the Rural Development Regulation 
offers the opportunity to promote the integrated and decentralised 
planning of agri-environment, agricultural and rural development 
measures. 
 
3.1.1 Direct Resources 
 
Agenda 2000 commits few additional resources directly for 
environmental supports.  Indeed, agri-environment expenditure as a 
component of the Rural Development Regulation is subject, in principle, 
to a freeze on spending until 2006.   This contrasts with the situation 
following the 1992 reforms of the CAP when agri-environment 
expenditure was allowed to rise year on year in response to the take-up of 
relevant measures by Member States.  The prospects for additional direct 
resources for environmental ends now depends on the possibilities to 
reorient certain production-related payments:  namely, through the re-use 
of monies recouped from the imposition of modulation and cross-
compliance conditions on commodity payments;  and through the 
‘greening’  of HLCAs (i.e. the additional payments to support livestock 
farming in Less Favoured Areas – LFAs). 
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Under the so-called horizontal regulation, which applies to all the 
commodity regimes, Member States are required to define appropriate 
environmental conditions (i.e. cross-compliance) to attach to commodity 
payments to farmers, as well as proportionate penalties - through 
forfeiture of payments - for farmers who infringe these conditions. 
Member States are also authorised to modulate direct payments per farm 
in relation to either employment on the farm, farm profitability criteria, or 
the total amount of state aids received.  The funds accrued from the 
withholding of payments under either measure will remain available to 
the particular Member State as an additional support for certain measures 
under the Rural Development Regulation, namely agri-environmental 
measures, Less Favoured Areas, early retirement and afforestation.  
However, the resources that may come available from penalising farmers 
for transgressing environmental cross-compliance conditions are likely to 
be neither significant nor reliable.  Modulation, though, could yield 
significant resources by reducing supports to large farms (typically arable 
ones).  Member States are entitled to modulate up to 20% of 
compensation payments to farmers, with the modulated savings available 
to be used within the Member States concerned as additional EU 
contributions to the accompanying measures.  With the Arable Area 
Payments Scheme representing some £1.1 billion in England, a 
maximalist approach to modulation could, in theory, yield upwards of 
£200 million.  However, one important constraint on the potential for 
redirecting resources through modulation will be the availability of 
national match-funding for the accompanying measures. 
 
Finally, there are the changes to HLCA payments.  The agreed shift from 
a headage to an area basis would not in itself make HLCAs an 
environmental payment. Allowances will be available to those who apply 
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"good farming practices compatible with the need to safeguard the 
environment and the countryside".  The UK Government’s statement that 
it “remains wholly committed to maintaining the environment and social 
fabric in the hills but has concluded that the support mechanisms should 
be modified to address these objectives more specifically” hints at a 
greater possibility. (Brown, 1998) This would, in effect, shift HLCAs 
from an indirect to a direct environmental and social support. 
 
A key feature of the original pyramid proposal was the notion of a basic 
tier “environmental resource payment”.  With so little additional monies 
directly for environmental support, it would be pointless to spread these 
thinly over all rural land.   The only place where one could sensibly begin 
to pursue such an approach would be the Less Favoured Areas, with 
HLCAs remoulded as basic environmental resource payments.  LFA 
policy would thus become critical in trialling greater integration between 
agricultural and environmental management.  Consequently, there could 
be two possible courses for policy development:  either that the LFAs 
provide a model for what could be pursued more generally;  or that a 
geographical divide is institutionalised between social and environmental 
farming in the LFAs and commercial farming elsewhere. 
 
3.1.2 Indirect Resources 
 
Of course, within the CAP commodity regimes there are much greater 
resources, and over some of these Agenda 2000 offers new scope to exert 
environmental influence, chiefly through: 
 
- the national envelopes, allowing member states discretion in how 
to distribute a proportion of direct payments to the beef and dairy 
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sectors, to give greater flexibility in addressing regional differences 
and to encourage extensive production; 
- the requirement on Member States to apply appropriate  
environmental conditions (or cross compliance) to support 
payments. 
 
Any broader effort, beyond the LFAs and stewardship areas, to redirect 
agriculture towards environmental objectives will depend crucially on 
these measures, and their effective deployment in turn will depend on the 
initiative and determination of individual Member States.  Even within 
the LFAs, because HLCAs are only a fraction of the subsidies that hill 
farmers receive, any effective greening of support policies would need in 
the short term to be complemented by the use of cross-compliance and 
the national envelope. 
 
3.1.3 An Integrated Support System for LFAs 
 
An integrated support system for the LFAs under Agenda 2000 could 
therefore look like the following: 
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MAIN RESOURCES 
   
Protected Sites 
And Features 
 
  
      National environmental funds; 
      Rural Development Regulation 
  
Agri-environmental measures; 
Environmental resource payments through 
redirection of HLCA’s 
 
 
             Rural Development 
            Regulation 
 
Environmental cross-compliance conditions applied to the 
sheep, beef and dairying regimes 
Programming of the national envelope to promote 
extensive beef and dairy cattle 
 
CAP 
  Commodity 
  payments 
 
 
The HLCAs would need to be redesigned as area payments and redirected 
to support the kind of farming systems that could deliver high 
biodiversity and landscape goods.  The funds specifically available for 
this, though, are very limited and could neither give sufficient support to 
the farming nor cover the costs of positive environmental management.  
This is why careful coordination is needed with the application of 
commodity payments on the one hand, and with agri-environment and 
conservation management payments on the other.  An additional 
possibility is opened up with the new LFA regulation which allows for 
payments to compensate for environmental restrictions.  This could mean 
elements of LFA support being inserted into the top layer to fund some 
management of protected sites. 
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The critical requirement will be for careful coordination between the 
layers to ensure that the rules and resources applied complement rather 
than duplicate one another.  In this regard, the Rural Development 
Regulation, as the main instrument for programming the middle layer in 
correlation with both national resources and CAP commodity payments, 
assumes strategic significance (see subsection 3.1.5). 
 
A different model would need to be applied, under Agenda 2000, to 
lowland farming in general and arable agriculture in particular - one of 
special sites and targeted agri-environment schemes resting on a base of 
environmental standards and legislation.  These two baseline layers thus 
become very important.  Conservation organisations have paid them 
insufficient attention, particularly the environmental standards layer. 
 
3.1.4 The Environmental Standards Layer and Cross-Compliance 
 
This is the layer to do with non-compulsory standards.   Its lower limits 
are set by legally defined environmental minima, and its upper limits by 
eligibility criteria for stewardship incentives (beyond which farmers can 
claim payments for their environmental actions).  The layer thus covers 
what is considered to be responsible farming practice.   These societal 
and professional norms are backed up by persuasion and market 
mechanisms.  Persuasion includes advice, information, training, codes, 
peer pressure, etc.  Market mechanisms include green consumerism, 
quality standards and manipulation of the farmers’ input and output prices 
through taxes and subsidies.  Environmental conditions (cross-
compliance) attached to commodity supports can be seen as a type of 
market mechanism. 
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Recently there has been much debate about the potential role of cross-
compliance as a policy instrument but it has been considered in isolation.  
Any use of cross-compliance must be related to the other available 
instruments in this layer, and the layer needs to be thought about 
strategically.  This calls for attention to environmental standard setting 
for agriculture.  While there are codes of good practice for different 
aspects of pollution and animal welfare, there are no such codes for 
landscape or nature conservation, although MAFF has in draft a 
conservation code.  Additionally, it is necessary to consider whether the 
available instruments reinforce and/or complement each other, and what 
their respective roles should be.  As the Environment Agency and the 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) have had much more 
experience in the development of environmental standards and because of 
the crucial division  between compulsory and non-compulsory standards, 
it would be sensible for the conservation agencies to cooperate with the 
Environment Agency and SEPA in an investigation of the relationship 
between standard setting, regulation and agriculture. 
 
3.1.5 The Rural Development Regulation 
 
The Regulation lays the basis for a Community rural development policy 
as a ‘second pillar’ (to that of commodity management) within the CAP.  
Rural development embraces both farm and non-farm developments as 
well as agri-environment measures and forestry.  The new Regulation 
allows considerable discretion to Member States to programme these 
different elements together holistically and in ways responsive to the 
diversity of rural conditions and circumstances.  Agri-environment 
measures are the only compulsory element which will have to be 
implemented throughout the territories of all Member States.  There is 
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also provision for training of farmers, farm workers and forest holders in 
conservation. 
 
However, initially, there are few additional resources to implement the 
Regulation (see subsection 3.1.1). The hope is that, in the longer term, 
monies saved from agricultural support could be made available for rural 
development.  There is no assurance, though, that this will happen. 
 
In the short and medium term, the most significant implications of the 
Regulation concern potential changes in procedure that could lay the 
basis for new institutional structures for rural development programming 
and support, around which over time the larger CAP could be 
transformed (see Section 4.2 below).  A key feature will be rural 
development plans.  These will cover a seven year period from 1 January 
2000.   It is vitally important that the right, forward-looking decisions are 
made about who should be responsible for drawing up and implementing 
these plans, what broader partnerships and consultations should be 
involved, and how these planning and programming questions should 
relate to other UK policies and structures for physical, economic and 
environmental planning. 
 
3.2 Implementing Agri-Environment Policy 
 
There are different possible approaches to the implementation of agri-
environment policy.  Crucial choices need to be made regarding the 
strategy for agri-environment expenditure and whether payments should 
relate to agricultural inputs or environmental outcomes. 
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3.2.1 Strategy for Agri-Environment Expenditure 
 
Agri-environment expenditure as an instrument of policy can be seen as 
both a means and an end.  As an end in itself it is concerned with enhancing 
the environmental value of farming; therefore it is important, subject to 
socio-economic considerations, to seek to maximise the environmental 
benefits from such expenditure.  As a means it is additionally the crucial set 
of incentives for reorienting agriculture onto a more sustainable course.  
Different emphases to these twin objectives have led EU member states to 
adopt different strategies, as revealed in the scale and pattern of their 
respective expenditures. 
 
In the decade 1987-97, agri-environment expenditure in the UK rose from 
0.2% to 3.2% of gross government expenditure on agriculture.  This 
represents roughly a 20-fold increase in real terms.  Even so, it still 
accounts for a very modest proportion of the overall agriculture budget.  
Moreover, despite being a pioneer of agri-environment policy, in terms of 
the amount of EAGGF expenditure spent under 2078/92 Britain ranks 10th 
out of the 15 member states, spending a small fraction of what, say, Austria, 
Finland, France and Germany do. 
 
The UK strategy to date for implementing 2078/92 can be characterised as 
narrow-and-deep compared with the shallow-and-wide approach adopted in 
some of these other countries.  The UK approach is oriented to the solution 
of discrete and specific problems of environmental conservation in the 
farmed countryside through circumscribed and targeted measures.  It places 
considerable emphasis on devising specific schemes, the negotiation of 
individual management agreements and the establishment of proper 
systems for monitoring and evaluation.  Start up costs, running costs and 
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monitoring/enforcement costs all tend to be high.  In England, these 
amounted to almost half of total expenditure (i.e. compensation payments 
plus administrative costs) on agri-environment measures in 1992/3, coming 
down to 23% in 1996/7 as the number of farmer-recipients grew.  
Arguably, the demands placed on administrative resources have acted as a 
significant constraint on the growth of agri-environment expenditure in the 
UK. 
 
The alternative approach of shallow-and-wide – typified in, say, France and 
Austria by general extensification schemes that support low intensity 
grazing systems – is justified from a perspective that sees agri-environment 
programmes as less significant in solving specific problems than in playing 
a pivotal role in the reorientation of the CAP.  In the short term at least, 
high levels of coverage and take-up of schemes may be more important 
than specific outcomes.  Unexacting environmental requirements and light 
administration may thus be pardonable.  The training of farmer-participants 
in conservation is also recognised as a key component and objective (which 
it has not been in the UK). 
 
These different national approaches face separate challenges in the future.  
To achieve significant environmental benefit, the shallow-and-wide 
strategy needs gradually but systematically to raise the requirements on 
farmers.  Some countries also have to put in place basic systems for 
monitoring and evaluating the outcome of the measures taken.  In Britain, 
in contrast, the challenge is to enable agri-environment expenditure to 
expand beyond the constraints of closely supervised and monitored 
programmes.  The UK experience to date could be interpreted as a set of 
pilot projects from which to devise large-scale schemes.  In gearing up in 
this way, the proportion of costs going on administrative overheads should 
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be cut sharply.  Whereas other countries could learn from British practice in 
monitoring and enforcement and in solving specific agri-environment 
problems, Britain could learn from best practice elsewhere in Europe in 
designing and administering efficient large-scale schemes.  The greening of 
LFAs represents a crucial challenge for Britain in this regard. 
 
3.2.2  Payments for Agricultural Inputs or Environmental Outcomes? 
 
The case now seems accepted that farmers should be rewarded for the 
provision of certain countryside goods, although it is not clear how best 
to do this.  The ideal might be that payments would be directly related to 
the environmental functions or benefits provided, e.g. the length of 
hedgerow maintained or the number of people making use of access land.  
However, in practice payments are most often linked to agricultural 
processes and inputs that give rise to the countryside goods in question. 
There are several reasons why payment by results may be impractical. 
 
Firstly, it may not be possible to characterise precisely the desired 
environmental outcomes, such as the functioning of a wetland or the 
composition of a landscape.  Second, there may be difficulties in 
measuring or monitoring such outcomes as wildlife populations or farm 
pollution.  Third, there are factors  - such as the weather or the breeding 
success of wildlife populations in other parts of the world  - that may 
greatly affect these outcomes but that are beyond the control or influence 
of farmers or landowners.  Consequently, relating specific outcomes to 
specific efforts in place and time may be impossible.  Fourth, even with 
localised environmental outcomes, many are a function of an extended 
geographical area that covers several holdings: thus water quality is a 
function of a river basin, pest infestations of a biogeographical zone, and 
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natural beauty of a field of vision.  Although the management of any one 
holding may strongly affect these outcomes, they are not reducible to 
individual actions but are a product of the total set of land management 
practices in the extended area.  A final reason relates to bureaucratic 
logistics.  It is often expedient for incentive procedures to correlate with 
other forms of intervention, and most of the available means of regulating 
land management (e.g. farm waste regulations, SSSI protection, 
development control and cross-compliance) target inputs, processes or 
operations not outcomes. 
 
Even so, although often the only practical course to secure countryside 
goods, payments linked to agricultural processes and inputs do have 
drawbacks. They have the appearance of a subsidy rather than a price: for 
example, they are usually based on the cost of supply rather than the 
value of, or demand for, the product.  They may not therefore lead to the 
optimum results according to economic theory, and they may arouse 
public criticism.  There is also no incentive for the farmer or landowner to 
take responsibility for the outcomes nor to experiment to improve the 
practice and understanding of ecosystem management.  Externally 
devised management prescriptions are unable to harness the farmer’s on-
the-spot knowledge, ability and proprietorial concern to respond to the 
contingency of events and the vagaries of the natural environment.  They 
do not therefore begin to effect the transformation in the role of the 
farmer to that of a responsible environmental manager.  However, it is 
only by fostering such a role that some of the risks and uncertainties in 
delivering countryside goods can be minimised. 
 
A way forward could be through stimulating learning partnerships 
involving groups of local farmers and conservation organisations.  To 
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encourage these arrangements a growing proportion of the input 
payments could be redirected as outcome payments paid to groups of 
farmers in relation to identifiable environmental benefits.  That would 
require conservation organisations to specify clearly what environmental 
outcomes are required and why. This should stimulate cooperation and 
mutual learning in the provision of countryside goods. 
 
3.3  Improving Regulation 
 
Reform of the CAP, as we have seen, only addresses the environmental 
standards and stewardship layers of the pyramid.  Progress on that front 
needs to go hand in hand with improvements in regulation.  The central 
challenge is to coordinate the incentives and restraints on farmers within a 
strategic framework of environmental objectives.  Improving regulation 
thus has two facets to it.  The first relates to better strategic coordination in 
the use of different measures and instruments.  The second relates to 
improving the regulatory floor.  Arguably, successful agri-environment 
policy will involve not only incentives for farmers, but a change in what 
they are expected to do – a change, that is, in the distribution of property 
rights over countryside goods between private and public rights.  One 
specific possibility to be considered is the case for a formal duty of care 
upon the owners and managers of agricultural land.  The discussion here is 
limited to options in domestic environmental policy.   The important 
possibilities that the development of EU environmental policy may present 
are beyond the scope of this study. 
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3.3.1 Coordination of Regulation 
 
One of the key objectives behind the pyramid idea is “a strategic approach 
to environmental management and protection that recognises that different 
objectives require a range of measures and instruments” (see p.4 above).  
However, a criticism we have levelled at the original pyramid is that “it 
incorporates a restricted view of the choice of environmental measures” 
(see p.4 above). 
 
The array of available measures and instruments is wide.  Indeed, there has 
been a great proliferation of them.  Compared with, say, the 1970s, public 
authorities and officials do not lack means to intervene in rural land 
management. 
 
There is, though, little overall strategy here.  The approach represents the 
typically British one of ad-hoc and pragmatic problem solving.  Hence the 
steady accumulation of a palimpsest of measures, a process encouraged by 
the fact that old ones are not allowed to die (lines on maps are difficult to 
erase not least because they become locked into local calculations of 
property rights and because designations are means of bureaucratic 
perpetuation).  A political factor that helped to ensure no overall strategy is 
that the greatest growth in available measures occurred paradoxically under 
the Thatcher and Major governments which were ideologically committed 
to deregulation.  The new Labour government, while far from being 
dirigiste, is certainly not beholden to rural landowners and is keen to 
encourage 'joined-up' thinking.  The time would seem ripe for a significant 
rationalisation of measures and the injection of a greater sense of strategy 
into their deployment. 
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Where there has been obvious progression in the past has been within 
policy traditions.  Take the following example: from SSSIs as a crude 
planning designation → compensatory management agreements to counter 
damaging agricultural activity → the positive incentives of the Wildlife 
Enhancement Scheme → the proposed tightening of restrictions on 
agricultural changes in SSSIs.  This seems to represent an increasingly 
sophisticated effort by regulators to achieve a refined balance of carrots and 
sticks as well as a crab-wise diminution of landowners' property rights.  
More generally, we could see this as a piece of social learning in which 
regulators and landowners have come to a closer understanding and 
accommodation of each others purposes and limits. 
 
The really glaring absences of coordination are between policy traditions.  
Even such obvious bedfellows as nature conservation, landscape and 
heritage are only poorly integrated.  And there seems to be barely any 
synergy between rural conservation policies and farm pollution controls 
(and considerable awkwardness over issues that fall between them, such as 
organic farming, NSAs and the protection of river ecosystems). 
 
3.3.2 Improving the Regulatory Floor 
 
In the development of British rural land management policy, we can point 
to a series of examples of what we might call the ‘ratcheting up’ of the 
regulatory floor.  If the ‘pyramid concept’ were to be developed as an 
evolutionary policy over time, then it is important to build in a process of 
improved environmental protection.  For example, at the start of the 1980s 
farmers were among the least regulated groups for water pollution.  They 
were exempt from prosecution if they followed ‘good agricultural practice’, 
and the code of practice which stipulated this was drawn up from an 
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agricultural production perspective.  By the early 1990s, farmers were 
subject to detailed regulations stipulating the construction standards for 
farm effluent storage facilities, they were no longer exempt from 
prosecution, and the Code of Good Agricultural Practice for the Protection 
of Water (MAFF, 1991) had been revised from an environmental protection 
perspective.  Parallel changes have taken place over wildlife protection and 
animal welfare concerns. 
 
An underlying force is a change in public values and expectations about 
farming’s environmental responsibilities.  Social change in rural areas, and 
the rise of a wider environmental consciousness have served to challenge a 
formerly dominant outlook which portrayed farmers as the natural 
guardians of the countryside.  The emergence of issues such as farm 
pollution, wildlife decline and animal welfare have generally eroded the 
public trust in the farming community and led to demands for new 
regulatory controls.   
 
Raising the regulatory floor in this way may, of course, bring into the realm 
of legal requirement actions or restraints for which farmers might otherwise 
have expected incentives or compensation.  The effect may be to remove 
the justification for making such payments.  The pursuit of improvements 
in regulation must be alert to the possible consequences of alienating or 
undermining the viability of affected farmers.  The reallocation of any 
resources saved, to promote higher (voluntary) environmental standards 
amongst the farmers concerned may represent an acceptable way forward. 
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3.3.3 A Duty of Care for Rural Land Managers 
 
 A recent report from the UK Round Table on Sustainable Development 
(HMSO, 1998) called on the Government to “develop a duty of care, in 
respect of wildlife, landscape and natural features, upon owners and 
managers of all agricultural and undeveloped land in rural areas” (p.26).  It 
argued that regulation governing water pollution had been strengthened in 
recent years, but that this had not been matched in issues concerning 
biodiversity and habitat protection.  The report cited analogous ‘duty of 
care’ approaches in the provisions of the Highway Code and in aspects of 
waste management.  
 
In its consultation paper on SSSIs, the DETR addressed the question of a 
duty of care as follows: 
 
 “It has been argued that one means of securing conservation of 
special sites would be through imposing a 'duty of care' on owners 
and occupiers, which would underpin and reinforce other 
legislative provisions…. A more constructive approach through 
direct liaison on site management statements, or management 
plans, and partnership between land managers and conservation 
agencies, underpinned by Codes of Practice, provides a more 
practicable way forward and is likely to deliver real benefits for 
nature conservation on special sites. It should also avoid the 
prospect of possibly fruitless litigation” (DETR, 1998a, para D9). 
 
 
However, it has not been proposed that a duty of care could be a substitute 
for the detailed instruments of site protection and management.  Indeed, it 
would be universal in its application and more general than the many 
specific regulations covering aspects of farming practice.  The argument for 
a duty of care is that it could help to strengthen, and give some coherence 
to, a basic regulatory floor governing rural land management.   More work 
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would need to be done to turn this into a practical proposition, particularly 
in defining the acceptable nature and scope of any legal duty. 
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4.  PROMOTING THE IDEAS 
 
This report has concentrated on the linkages between agricultural and 
environmental policy.  Recognition of the multifunctionality of 
agriculture and rural resources, though, requires a move away from 
sectoral policies towards integrated territorial strategies, combining 
social, economic and environmental dimensions, and responsive to the 
diversity of rural areas and the functions they serve.  In considering how 
to take forward the report’s proposals, therefore, it is important also to 
consider the linkages with rural socio-economic policy and how these 
might be strengthened as part of an integrated rural strategy. 
 
As well as the CAP, Agenda 2000 has reformed the Structural Funds.  
These have not been part of the present study.  However, they clearly 
offer lessons for the integrated programming of agricultural and rural 
development.  The Rural Development Regulation at least needs to 
incorporate these lessons, and its implementation will have to be 
coordinated with the new round of Structural Fund Programmes.  In 
pursuing these and other opportunities it is important to be clear about the 
potential synergies between agricultural and environmental policy on the 
one hand and rural and regional policy on the other hand (subsection 4.1).   
 
Agenda 2000 still leaves the CAP as a predominantly sectoral policy.  
Nevertheless, it does provide scope for certain procedural and 
institutional changes that could pave the way for a more integrated 
approach.  The important requirement is to establish structures that could 
begin to reintegrate agriculture into the rural economy and rural 
environment within a regional context.  Subsection 4.2 puts forward a 
proposal for achieving this. 
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4.1 Potential Links to Rural and Regional Policy 
 
Possible linkages between agricultural-cum-environmental policy and 
rural and regional policy are as follows:   
 
• countryside public goods include not only environmental assets 
but valued social assets too, such as rural amenities and cultures.  
Where, as is often the case, these social attributes have co-evolved 
with traditional agricultural systems, their continued existence may 
well depend upon the continuity of certain farming activities.  Thus, 
the social and environmental rationales for the support of traditional 
agricultural systems may well coincide. 
 
• environmental development can be an element of economic 
regeneration or restructuring.  Countryside public goods need not 
only be a product of the past.  There may be a strong public interest in 
the creation of new ones. Landscape restoration or habitat creation 
may thus be desirable in certain areas as an aspect of rural 
regeneration.  A related need may be the restructuring of agriculture to 
create farming structures and systems better suited to furnish 
countryside public goods.   
 
• countryside goods can play a key role in product and place 
differentiation.  The countryside is valued for distinct places and 
products.  This is a competitive advantage as well as an environmental 
or consumption good.  A key aspect of the diversification of rural 
economies is support and encouragement for activities which maintain 
that competitive advantage. Also important are the promotion and 
development of products which are identified with a particular place 
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or reflect local distinctiveness (e.g. Coquetdale cheese and Shetland 
wool) or which help to maintain environmental values (e.g. organic 
food and coppicing products).  In this way, the creation of value-added 
and employment can be retained locally.  The distinctive 
environmental and cultural attributes of rural areas can also be useful 
in product and place marketing for purposes of rural and regional 
development. 
 
The Rural Development Regulation and the Structural Funds offer scope 
to explore these different synergies. 
 
4.2 A Regionally Integrated Approach to Programming and 
Planning 
 
The new Rural Development Regulation provides an opportunity for a 
strategic and integrated view to be developed for each region of the future 
of the countryside and the role of farming within it.  However, the limited 
additional resources on offer under the Regulation provide little incentive 
to alter existing arrangements along the lines proposed.  Fortunately, 
current changes in UK structures for rural and regional policy create both 
an opening, and the necessity, for new approaches. 
 
In Scotland and Wales, the key factor is the greater devolution of 
agricultural policy and the possibilities opened up, under the Parliament 
and the Assembly, for greater integration with environmental and rural 
policy.  In England, the key factors are the new Countryside Agency and 
the Regional Development Agencies and the increasing need for the 
strategic coordination of policy delivery at the regional level.  Otherwise, 
there is the risk that MAFF’s emerging rural development 
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responsibilities, the new Countryside Agency’s expansive remit and the 
rural responsibilities of the RDAs will lead to overlap and duplication of 
effort, bureaucratic conflict and public confusion. 
 
What should the coordinating mechanism look like?  We would propose 
Regional Agricultural and Rural Development Strategies (RARDS).  
These would be drawn up, for Scotland, jointly by the Scottish Office, 
Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise and Scottish 
Natural Heritage; for Wales, jointly by the Welsh Office, the Welsh 
Development Agency and the Countryside Council for Wales; and for the 
English regions, jointly by MAFF, the Regional Development Agencies 
and the Countryside Agency. RARDS would generate the following 
benefits: 
 
- The joint exercises would bring together different traditions in rural 
and agricultural policy in a strategic approach to the 
implementation of policy, sensitive to different local and regional 
contexts. 
 
- RARDS would help prevent the duplication of effort by national 
and regional officials that would occur if development agencies 
were to prepare rural strategies (from the perspective of economic 
regeneration and sustainable development) and agriculture 
departments were to prepare additional rural development plans 
(from the perspective of agricultural structural and agri-
environmental policy). 
 
- RARDS could include wider consideration of the desirable 
structure of the farming industry, not only from the perspective of 
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competitiveness, but also of the needs of the rural environment, 
economy and communities.  They could provide access 
to structural and economic regeneration resources for 
agricultural interests wishing to diversify, at the same time as 
opening up the possibility, under the Rural Development 
Regulation, of CAP monies being paid to non-farming interests to 
foster the adaptation and diversification of rural economies. 
 
- The RARDS could also provide a framework in which to 
programme the regional implementation of national envelopes for 
the beef and dairy sectors; to formulate indicative forestry 
strategies; and to develop a clear rural dimension to Regional 
Planning Guidance and to development plans. 
 
A formal requirement for the different organisations to draw up RARDS 
together, in full consultation with regional partners,  is a practical 
proposal that would help crystallise a truly integrated approach to rural 
and agricultural policy, that often struggles to take off beyond the level of 
rhetoric.  There is an opportunity here to foster real institutional learning 
and enhance strategic capacity in the rural and agricultural policy fields in 
Scotland, Wales and the English regions.  In the medium to long term, 
RARDS would provide a framework through which funds released from 
reductions in CAP commodity payments would “increasingly allow 
financial support to rural areas to take account of their environmental and 
social, as well as economic needs, while encouraging a competitive and 
efficient agriculture” (DETR, 1998b, para 6). 
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